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Single Idea 3575
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
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Full Idea
The classical Five Modes of Scepticism are Discrepancy (people always disagree), Relativity ('according to you'), Infinity (infinite regress of questions), Assumption (ending in dogma) and Circularity (end up where you started).
Gist of Idea
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.61
A Reaction
I take Relativity to be different from scepticism (because, roughly, it says there is nothing to know), and the others go with Agrippa's Trilemma of justification, which may have solutions.
The
34 ideas
from Michael Williams
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8849
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Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist
[Williams,M]
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8851
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Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification
[Williams,M]
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8852
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In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option
[Williams,M]
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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8855
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Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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