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Single Idea 3576

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique ]

Full Idea

The foundationalists dilemma is to define a basis for knowledge modest enough to be secure but rich enough to be adequate.

Gist of Idea

Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security

Source

Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7)

Book Ref

Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.85

A Reaction

..And that is just what they are unable to do, precisely because adequate support would have to have enough content to be defeasibe or fallible.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]:

16716 It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
2235 There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
5541 A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
10486 If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
8485 We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
8792 Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
8825 It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
8799 If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
8795 Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
3576 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
3577 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
10339 Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]