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Single Idea 3577
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
]
Full Idea
A strongly justificationist view of rationality may not be so rational; we want the truth, but avoiding all errors and maximising our number of true beliefs are not the same thing.
Gist of Idea
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.88
A Reaction
An interesting dilemma - to avoid all errors, believing nothing; to maximise true belief, believe everything. It is rational to follow intuition, guesses, and a wing and a prayer - once you are experienced and educated.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]:
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16716
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It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain
[Anon (Par)]
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2235
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There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference
[Hume]
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5541
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A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
[Kant]
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10486
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If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo
[Boolos on Neurath]
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8485
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We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock
[Neurath]
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8792
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Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what
[Sellars]
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8802
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Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
[Davidson]
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8825
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It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
[Kim]
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8799
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If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations
[Sosa]
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8795
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Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error
[Sosa]
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2523
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That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations
[Dennett]
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3699
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The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements
[Bonjour]
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2753
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Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
[Dancy,J]
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3577
|
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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6363
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
[Pollock/Cruz]
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3754
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Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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10339
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Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
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