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Full Idea
Empirical foundationists must decide whether knowledge ultimately rests on either beliefs or judgements about experience, or on the experiences or sensations themselves.
Gist of Idea
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.96
A Reaction
This clarifies the key issue very nicely, and I firmly vote for the former option. The simplest point is that error is possible about what sensations are taken to be of, so they won't do on their own.
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |