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Single Idea 3580

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs ]

Full Idea

If we are to treat experience as the foundation of knowledge, then experience must itself be understood to involve propositional content.

Gist of Idea

Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations

Source

Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)

Book Ref

Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.97


A Reaction

This sounds right, but since pure 'experience' obviously doesn't have propositional content, because it needs interpretation and evaluation, then this strategy won't work.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:

When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]