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Single Idea 3586
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
]
Full Idea
Justification requires logical rather than causal connections. That is the point of the slogan that only a belief can justify a belief.
Gist of Idea
Only a belief can justify a belief
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.122
A Reaction
It seems better to talk of 'rational' connections, rather than 'logical' connections. It isn't 'logical' to believe that someone despises me because their lip is faintly curled.
The
29 ideas
from 'Problems of Knowledge'
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
|
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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