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Single Idea 3594
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
]
Full Idea
All the sceptic's arguments show is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence.
Gist of Idea
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.148
The
29 ideas
from 'Problems of Knowledge'
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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