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Single Idea 3597

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism ]

Full Idea

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.

Gist of Idea

Foundations need not precede other beliefs

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14

Book Ref

Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.165


A Reaction

A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [claim that knowledge foundations are possible]:

Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]