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Single Idea 3608
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
]
Full Idea
I could pretend that I had no body, and that there was no world or place that I was in, but I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist.
Gist of Idea
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence
Source
René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §4.32)
Book Ref
Descartes,René: 'Discourse on Method/The Meditations', ed/tr. Sutcliffe,F.E. [Penguin 1968], p.54
A Reaction
He makes the (in my opinion) appalling blunder of thinking that because he can pretend that he has no body, that therefore he might not have one. I can pretend that gold is an unusual form of cheese. However, "I don't exist" certainly sounds wrong.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[mind and matter are two quite different substances]:
3519
|
Man uses his body, so must be separate from it
[Anon (Plat), by Maslin]
|
1710
|
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them
[Aristotle]
|
13307
|
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul
[Seneca]
|
21809
|
Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body
[Plotinus]
|
21825
|
The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order
[Plotinus]
|
18458
|
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition
[Porphyry]
|
22105
|
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle
[Aquinas]
|
24028
|
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body
[Descartes]
|
3608
|
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence
[Descartes]
|
3613
|
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs
[Descartes]
|
2276
|
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks
[Descartes]
|
2298
|
Mind is not extended, unlike the body
[Descartes]
|
3423
|
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist
[Descartes, by Kim]
|
2303
|
The mind is utterly indivisible
[Descartes]
|
5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance
[Descartes]
|
19409
|
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes
[Leibniz]
|
5585
|
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
[Kant]
|
22039
|
Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity
[Hegel, by Pinkard]
|
14802
|
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction
[Peirce]
|
2620
|
Dualism is a category mistake
[Ryle]
|
4069
|
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
[Crane]
|
8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
|