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Single Idea 3701
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
]
Full Idea
An externalist theory of epistemic justification or warrant need not involve the possession by the believer of anything like a reason for thinking that their belief is true.
Gist of Idea
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
Source
Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7)
Book Ref
Bonjour,Laurence: 'In Defense of Pure Reason' [CUP 1998], p.96
A Reaction
That is the problem with externalism. If the believer does not have a reason, then why would they believe? Externalists are interesting on justification, but daft about belief. Why do I believe I know something, when I can't recall how I learnt it?
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[general issues about external justification]:
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2555
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For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
[Locke, by Rorty]
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6948
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
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4253
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Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
[Armstrong]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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8812
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Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
[Pollock]
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8816
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Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
[Pollock]
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3701
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Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
[Bonjour]
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4258
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Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
[Bonjour]
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2776
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Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
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9382
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Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
[Burge]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
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4065
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Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
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6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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3755
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Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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4254
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Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification
[Kornblith]
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3568
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Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts?
[Cross,A]
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17723
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Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed
[Jenkins]
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19704
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Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications
[Vahid]
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