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Single Idea 3729

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty ]

Full Idea

Inclinations, as a source of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them.

Gist of Idea

Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them

Source

Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'The Moral Law (Groundwork of Morals)', ed/tr. Paton,H.J. [Hutchinson 1948], p.90


The 19 ideas with the same theme [reasons why someone should want to do their duty]:

Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant]
Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant]
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant]
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant]
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]