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Single Idea 3732

[filed under theme 24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights ]

Full Idea

A violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means, not considering that they should be used only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action.

Gist of Idea

Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means

Source

Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'The Moral Law (Groundwork of Morals)', ed/tr. Paton,H.J. [Hutchinson 1948], p.92


The 22 ideas with the same theme [rights that seem to belong to any living creature]:

Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck]
Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck]
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling]