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Full Idea
If sense experiences are non-epistemic they may be infallible, but they are unsuitable for providing the foundations for other beliefs.
Gist of Idea
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic
Source
Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
Book Ref
'Knowledge: readings in contemp epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker/Dretske [OUP 2000], p.232
A Reaction
If we experience flashing lights in the retina, or an afterimage, we don't think we are seeing objects, so why is normal perception different? Ans: because it is supported by judgement.
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |