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Single Idea 3790
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
]
Full Idea
The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to the question of what we believe.
Gist of Idea
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], i.437)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Elbow Room - Free will worth wanting' [MIT 1999], p.27
A Reaction
This should have nipped the causal theory of knowledge in the bud before it got started. Everyone has a different cause for their belief that 'it sometimes rains'. Cause is not justification.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:
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11052
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Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief
[Frege]
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3790
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Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
[Wittgenstein]
|
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
|
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8798
|
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification
[Sosa]
|
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16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
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3795
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Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
[Dennett]
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2746
|
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
[Dancy,J]
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2747
|
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
[Dancy,J]
|
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3569
|
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3567
|
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
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3586
|
Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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3898
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My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
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6358
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One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
[Pollock/Cruz]
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10350
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Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
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