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Single Idea 3795

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

In causal theories of knowledge and reference, the causal chain between object and thought must be of the "right" sort - the nature of rightness to be specified later, typically.

Gist of Idea

Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.3 n14)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Elbow Room - Free will worth wanting' [MIT 1999], p.58


A Reaction

This is now the standard objection to a purely causal account of reference. Which of the many causal chains causes the meaning? Knowledge of maths is a further problem for it.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]