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Single Idea 3812

[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason ]

Full Idea

The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality.

Clarification

'Intentionality' is the capacity to think ABOUT things, to have meaning

Gist of Idea

Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality

Source

John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.23

The 34 ideas from 'Rationality in Action'

3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]