more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Hume's thought that each perception is separate and distinct cannot be right, because then we can't distinguish between one consciousness with ten experiences and ten different consciousnesses.
Gist of Idea
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds
Source
comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by John Searle - Rationality in Action Ch.3.VI
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.77
A Reaction
Why can't the only connection between them be that they all occur to the speaker who reports to them? How would I know if one of 'my' mental events actually belonged to a neighbour and had strayed. If it was coherent, I would accept it.
| 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
| 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
| 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
| 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
| 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1394 | Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers] |
| 1395 | Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers] |