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Single Idea 3823
[filed under theme 16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
]
Full Idea
I am held responsible now for things that I did in the distant past. But that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now.
Gist of Idea
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.90
A Reaction
A possible response, of course, is that you are held responsible for your past deeds, but you shouldn't be. The idea that you are the same as when you committed the crime is a convenient fiction for people who desire revenge. Responsibility fades.
The
34 ideas
from 'Rationality in Action'
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3811
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Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
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3812
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Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
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3809
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If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
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3810
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In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
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3808
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Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
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3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
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3813
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'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
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3815
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The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
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3816
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Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
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3818
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We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
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3817
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Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
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3827
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The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
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3825
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Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
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3828
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Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
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3826
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A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
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3822
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Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
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3820
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The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
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3823
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Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
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3821
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Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
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3824
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A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
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3829
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Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3834
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An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
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3835
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If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
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3836
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If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
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3839
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Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
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3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3838
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Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
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3840
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We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
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3841
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
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3806
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Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
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