more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3824
[filed under theme 16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
]
Full Idea
In order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions.
Gist of Idea
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VIII)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.92
A Reaction
I can't accept this all-or-nothing account. A chimpanzee is some sort of 'agent', and there are bad chimpanzees you wouldn't want in your colony. Why does Searle want to cut us off in some special compound where our actions are totally different?
The
116 ideas
from John Searle
2427
|
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think
[Searle, by Chalmers]
|
7389
|
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine
[Dennett on Searle]
|
7390
|
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain?
[Dennett on Searle]
|
5789
|
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder
[Searle]
|
5787
|
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity
[Searle]
|
5790
|
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property
[Searle]
|
5786
|
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot
[Searle]
|
5788
|
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate
[Searle]
|
5792
|
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem'
[Searle]
|
5791
|
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation
[Searle]
|
5794
|
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint
[Searle]
|
5799
|
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets
[Searle]
|
5798
|
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something
[Searle]
|
5796
|
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings
[Searle]
|
5797
|
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons
[Searle]
|
5795
|
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't
[Searle]
|
7746
|
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them)
[Searle]
|
7747
|
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense?
[Searle]
|
7748
|
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"'
[Searle]
|
7749
|
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions
[Searle]
|
7750
|
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way
[Searle]
|
3810
|
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
|
3811
|
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
|
3812
|
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
|
3809
|
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
|
3813
|
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
|
3814
|
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
|
3808
|
Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
|
3815
|
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
|
3816
|
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
|
3817
|
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
|
3818
|
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
|
3827
|
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
|
3828
|
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
|
3826
|
A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
|
3825
|
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
|
3823
|
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
|
3821
|
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
|
3822
|
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
|
3820
|
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
|
3824
|
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
|
3829
|
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
|
3830
|
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
|
3832
|
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
|
3831
|
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
|
3833
|
A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3834
|
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
|
3835
|
If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
|
3836
|
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
|
3839
|
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
|
3837
|
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3838
|
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
|
3840
|
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
|
3841
|
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
|
3806
|
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
|
9317
|
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
|
3450
|
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
[Searle]
|
3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
3454
|
Reality is entirely particles in force fields
[Searle]
|
3451
|
Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
3457
|
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
[Searle]
|
3458
|
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
[Searle]
|
3459
|
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
[Searle]
|
3462
|
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
[Searle]
|
3461
|
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
|
3464
|
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
|
3463
|
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
[Searle]
|
3465
|
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
|
4088
|
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
[Searle]
|
3466
|
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
[Searle]
|
3467
|
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
|
3468
|
I cannot observe my own subjectivity
[Searle]
|
3470
|
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
[Searle]
|
3469
|
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
[Searle]
|
3471
|
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
[Searle]
|
3472
|
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
[Searle]
|
3473
|
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
[Searle]
|
3474
|
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
|
3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
3478
|
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
|
3532
|
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
[Maslin on Searle]
|
3533
|
Is supervenience just causality?
[Searle, by Maslin]
|
3477
|
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
|
3531
|
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
|
3476
|
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
|
3479
|
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
[Searle]
|
3480
|
We experience unity at an instant and across time
[Searle]
|
3481
|
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
|
3482
|
Perception is a function of expectation
[Searle]
|
3483
|
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
|
3484
|
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
|
3485
|
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
[Searle]
|
3486
|
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
[Searle]
|
3487
|
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
[Searle]
|
3489
|
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
|
3490
|
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
[Searle]
|
3491
|
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
[Searle]
|
3492
|
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
|
3493
|
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
[Searle]
|
3494
|
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
|
3495
|
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
[Searle]
|
3496
|
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
[Searle]
|
3497
|
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
|
3498
|
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
[Searle]
|
3500
|
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
|
3499
|
Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
|
3501
|
If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
|
3502
|
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
[Searle]
|
3503
|
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
[Searle]
|
3504
|
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
[Searle]
|
3505
|
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
[Searle]
|
3506
|
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
[Searle]
|
3507
|
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
[Searle]
|
3508
|
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
[Searle]
|