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Single Idea 3827
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
]
Full Idea
The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced.
Gist of Idea
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.93
A Reaction
A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others.
The
116 ideas
from John Searle
2427
|
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think
[Searle, by Chalmers]
|
7389
|
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine
[Dennett on Searle]
|
7390
|
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain?
[Dennett on Searle]
|
5789
|
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder
[Searle]
|
5787
|
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity
[Searle]
|
5790
|
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property
[Searle]
|
5786
|
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot
[Searle]
|
5788
|
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate
[Searle]
|
5792
|
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem'
[Searle]
|
5791
|
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation
[Searle]
|
5794
|
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint
[Searle]
|
5799
|
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets
[Searle]
|
5798
|
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something
[Searle]
|
5796
|
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings
[Searle]
|
5797
|
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons
[Searle]
|
5795
|
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't
[Searle]
|
7746
|
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them)
[Searle]
|
7747
|
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense?
[Searle]
|
7748
|
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"'
[Searle]
|
7749
|
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions
[Searle]
|
7750
|
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way
[Searle]
|
3810
|
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
|
3811
|
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
|
3812
|
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
|
3809
|
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
|
3808
|
Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
|
3814
|
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
|
3815
|
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
|
3813
|
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
|
3816
|
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
|
3818
|
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
|
3817
|
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
|
3827
|
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
|
3826
|
A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
|
3828
|
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
|
3825
|
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
|
3823
|
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
|
3821
|
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
|
3822
|
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
|
3820
|
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
|
3824
|
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
|
3829
|
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
|
3830
|
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
|
3832
|
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
|
3831
|
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
|
3833
|
A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3834
|
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
|
3835
|
If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
|
3836
|
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
|
3839
|
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
|
3837
|
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3838
|
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
|
3840
|
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
|
3841
|
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
|
3806
|
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
|
9317
|
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
|
3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
3450
|
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
[Searle]
|
3451
|
Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
|
3454
|
Reality is entirely particles in force fields
[Searle]
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
3457
|
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
[Searle]
|
3458
|
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
[Searle]
|
3459
|
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
[Searle]
|
3462
|
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
[Searle]
|
3461
|
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
|
3463
|
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
[Searle]
|
3464
|
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
|
3465
|
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
|
4088
|
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
[Searle]
|
3466
|
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
[Searle]
|
3467
|
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
|
3468
|
I cannot observe my own subjectivity
[Searle]
|
3469
|
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
[Searle]
|
3470
|
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
[Searle]
|
3471
|
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
[Searle]
|
3472
|
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
[Searle]
|
3473
|
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
[Searle]
|
3474
|
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
|
3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
3478
|
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
|
3532
|
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
[Maslin on Searle]
|
3533
|
Is supervenience just causality?
[Searle, by Maslin]
|
3476
|
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
|
3477
|
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
|
3531
|
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
|
3479
|
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
[Searle]
|
3480
|
We experience unity at an instant and across time
[Searle]
|
3481
|
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
|
3482
|
Perception is a function of expectation
[Searle]
|
3483
|
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
|
3484
|
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
|
3485
|
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
[Searle]
|
3486
|
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
[Searle]
|
3487
|
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
[Searle]
|
3489
|
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
|
3490
|
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
[Searle]
|
3491
|
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
[Searle]
|
3492
|
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
|
3493
|
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
[Searle]
|
3494
|
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
|
3495
|
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
[Searle]
|
3496
|
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
[Searle]
|
3497
|
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
|
3498
|
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
[Searle]
|
3500
|
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
|
3499
|
Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
|
3501
|
If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
|
3502
|
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
[Searle]
|
3504
|
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
[Searle]
|
3503
|
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
[Searle]
|
3505
|
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
[Searle]
|
3506
|
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
[Searle]
|
3507
|
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
[Searle]
|
3508
|
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
[Searle]
|