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Single Idea 3831

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues ]

Full Idea

Both reasons and the things they are reasons for can be either facts in the world or intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.

Gist of Idea

Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states

Source

John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.102

A Reaction

One might point out that beliefs, desires and intentions are facts in the world too. Implicit dualism. One can ask, what turns a fact into a reason?

The 15 ideas with the same theme [areas of interest concerning justification]:

6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
8836 Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
8837 Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
12413 A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
3564 Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
21626 Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
4722 Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
19729 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]