more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3832
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
]
Full Idea
Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing.
Gist of Idea
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.107
A Reaction
This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:
|
11052
|
Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief
[Frege]
|
|
3790
|
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
3832
|
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
|
|
8798
|
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification
[Sosa]
|
|
16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
|
3795
|
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
[Dennett]
|
|
2746
|
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
[Dancy,J]
|
|
2747
|
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
[Dancy,J]
|
|
3569
|
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
|
|
3567
|
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
|
|
3586
|
Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
|
|
3898
|
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
|
|
6358
|
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|