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Single Idea 3832
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
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Full Idea
Causes are typically events, reasons are never events. You can give a reason by stating a cause, but it does not follow that the reason and the cause are the same thing.
Gist of Idea
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.I)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.107
A Reaction
This is against Davidson. I'm with Searle here; my having a reason to do something is not the cause of my doing it. I don't, unlike Searle, believe in free will, but doing something for a reason is not just the operation of the reason.
The
34 ideas
from 'Rationality in Action'
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3811
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Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
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3812
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Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
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3809
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If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
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3810
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In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
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3808
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Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
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3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
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3813
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'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
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3815
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The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
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3816
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Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
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3818
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We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
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3817
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Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
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3827
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The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
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3825
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Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
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3828
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Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
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3826
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A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
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3822
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Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
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3820
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The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
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3823
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Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
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3821
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Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
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3824
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A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
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3829
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Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3834
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An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
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3835
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If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
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3836
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If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
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3839
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Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
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3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3838
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Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
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3840
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We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
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3841
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
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3806
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Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
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