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Single Idea 3833
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
A belief is a commitment to truth.
Gist of Idea
A belief is a commitment to truth
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.119
The
34 ideas
from 'Rationality in Action'
3811
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Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
|
3812
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Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
|
3809
|
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
|
3810
|
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
|
3808
|
Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
|
3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
|
3815
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The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
|
3813
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'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
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3816
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Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
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3818
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We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
|
3817
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Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
|
3828
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Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
|
3825
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Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
|
3827
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The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
|
3826
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A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
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3822
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Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
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3820
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The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
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3823
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Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
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3821
|
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
|
3824
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A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
|
3829
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Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3834
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An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
|
3835
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If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
|
3836
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If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
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3839
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Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
|
3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
3838
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Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
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3840
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We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
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3841
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
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3806
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Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
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