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Single Idea 3856
[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
]
Full Idea
Popper's principles are roughly that one theory is superior to another if it has greater empirical content, if it can account for the successes of the first theory, and if it has not been falsified (unlike the first theory).
Gist of Idea
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified
Source
report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science I.6
Book Ref
Newton-Smith,W.H.: 'The Rationality of Science' [RKP 1981], p.15
The
16 ideas
from Karl Popper
12176
|
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations
[Popper]
|
12175
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Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations
[Popper]
|
12179
|
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised
[Popper]
|
12177
|
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes
[Popper]
|
7780
|
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science
[Popper, by Magee]
|
16830
|
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them
[Lipton on Popper]
|
6794
|
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified
[Bird on Popper]
|
6795
|
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out
[Bird on Popper]
|
3856
|
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified
[Popper, by Newton-Smith]
|
3860
|
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected
[Newton-Smith on Popper]
|
22188
|
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations?
[Gorham on Popper]
|
7779
|
There is no such thing as induction
[Popper, by Magee]
|
22358
|
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing
[Popper]
|
5451
|
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress
[Popper, by Mautner]
|
18284
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Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively)
[Popper]
|
11946
|
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
[Popper]
|