more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 3866

[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability ]

Full Idea

If theories are genuinely incommensurable why should I be faced with the problem of choosing between them? Why not believe them all?

Gist of Idea

If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all

Source

W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], VII.1)

Book Ref

Newton-Smith,W.H.: 'The Rationality of Science' [RKP 1981], p.148


The 10 ideas with the same theme [possibility of comparison between theories]:

Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]