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Single Idea 3891
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
]
Full Idea
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p.
Clarification
'Sufficient for q' means it must occur; 'necessary for p' means no p without it
Gist of Idea
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
Source
Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 15.7)
Book Ref
Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.194
Related Idea
Idea 4739
In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
The
29 ideas
from 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'
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3878
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Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?
[Scruton]
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3879
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Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything
[Scruton]
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3880
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Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion
[Scruton]
|
|
3881
|
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness
[Scruton]
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3882
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Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private
[Scruton]
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3883
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A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
[Scruton]
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3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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3885
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We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities
[Scruton]
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3886
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Membership is the greatest source of obligation
[Scruton]
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3887
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Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori
[Scruton]
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3888
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Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re
[Scruton]
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3890
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'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
[Scruton]
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3891
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If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
[Scruton]
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3892
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Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same
[Scruton]
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3894
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We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
[Scruton]
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3895
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The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers
[Scruton]
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3896
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Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in
[Scruton]
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3897
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Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
[Scruton]
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3898
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My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
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3899
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The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states
[Scruton]
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3901
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Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities
[Scruton]
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3903
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The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable
[Scruton]
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3904
|
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it
[Scruton]
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3905
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'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance
[Scruton]
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3906
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If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
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3907
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Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?
[Scruton]
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3908
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If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs
[Scruton]
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3910
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If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?
[Scruton]
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3911
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The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence
[Scruton]
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