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Single Idea 3894
[filed under theme 2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
]
Full Idea
The 'open question' argument is clearly invalid. A question remains open just so long as our ignorance permits. …It may be an open question whether promoting happiness is good, even though this is what 'good' means.
Clarification
G.E.Moore's Open Question argument claimed that 'good' cannot be a natural property, because it can always be asked if such things are good
Gist of Idea
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
Source
Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.1)
Book Ref
Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.273
A Reaction
A nice objection. Like small children, we can keep asking questions forever. Whether there is a question to be asked about a thing is not a property of that thing, but of us who ask it.
Related Idea
Idea 11057
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
The
29 ideas
from 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'
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3878
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Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?
[Scruton]
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3879
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Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything
[Scruton]
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3880
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Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion
[Scruton]
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3881
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In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness
[Scruton]
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3882
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Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private
[Scruton]
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3883
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A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
[Scruton]
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3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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3885
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We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities
[Scruton]
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3886
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Membership is the greatest source of obligation
[Scruton]
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3887
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Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori
[Scruton]
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3888
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Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re
[Scruton]
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3890
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'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
[Scruton]
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3891
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If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
[Scruton]
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3892
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Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same
[Scruton]
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3894
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We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
[Scruton]
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3895
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The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers
[Scruton]
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3896
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Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in
[Scruton]
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3897
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Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
[Scruton]
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3898
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My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
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3899
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The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states
[Scruton]
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3901
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Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities
[Scruton]
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3903
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The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable
[Scruton]
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3904
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Measuring space requires no movement while I do it
[Scruton]
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3905
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'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance
[Scruton]
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3906
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If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
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3907
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Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?
[Scruton]
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3908
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If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs
[Scruton]
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3910
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If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?
[Scruton]
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3911
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The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence
[Scruton]
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