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Single Idea 3897
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
]
Full Idea
In my view the concept of knowledge is of no very great interest in epistemology, which actually concerns the justification of belief.
Gist of Idea
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
Source
Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22)
Book Ref
Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.317
A Reaction
I think this is an excellent thought. I see knowledge as slippery, and partially contextual, and I don't care whether someone precisely 'knows' something. I just want to know why they believe it.
Related Idea
Idea 19539
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
The
29 ideas
from 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'
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3878
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Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?
[Scruton]
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3879
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Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything
[Scruton]
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3880
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Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion
[Scruton]
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3881
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In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness
[Scruton]
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3882
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Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private
[Scruton]
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3883
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A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
[Scruton]
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3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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3885
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We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities
[Scruton]
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3886
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Membership is the greatest source of obligation
[Scruton]
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3887
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Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori
[Scruton]
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3888
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Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re
[Scruton]
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3890
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'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
[Scruton]
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3891
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If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
[Scruton]
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3892
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Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same
[Scruton]
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3894
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We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
[Scruton]
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3895
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The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers
[Scruton]
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3896
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Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in
[Scruton]
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3897
|
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
[Scruton]
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3898
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My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
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3899
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The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states
[Scruton]
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3901
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Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities
[Scruton]
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3903
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The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable
[Scruton]
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3904
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Measuring space requires no movement while I do it
[Scruton]
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3905
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'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance
[Scruton]
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3906
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If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
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3907
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Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?
[Scruton]
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3908
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If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs
[Scruton]
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3910
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If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?
[Scruton]
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3911
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The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence
[Scruton]
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