more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 3898

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

It is impossible that my present belief that it will rain tomorrow is caused by its raining tomorrow.

Gist of Idea

My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow

Source

Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22.4)

Book Ref

Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.322


A Reaction

This doesn't demolish a causal account of belief. It would be very surprising if I were to believe it was going to rain tomorrow for no cause whatsoever. That would be irrational.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]