more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process.
Clarification
This makes non-conscious perception a possibility
Gist of Idea
Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4
Book Ref
Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.336
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |