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Single Idea 3906
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
]
Full Idea
If the only way of defining properties involves quantifying over possible worlds, this could be taken as another reason for abandoning properties altogether.
Clarification
The problem comes from trying to define properties in terms of sets
Gist of Idea
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
Source
Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.4)
Book Ref
Scruton,Roger: 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994], p.392
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[rejection of the category of properties]:
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16621
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Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size
[Hobbes]
|
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4546
|
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
[Nietzsche]
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6063
|
Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
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18439
|
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
[Quine]
|
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9017
|
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
[Quine]
|
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7925
|
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
[Quine]
|
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10295
|
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
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3322
|
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
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6078
|
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
|
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
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7618
|
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
|
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
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8959
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Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science
[Field,H, by Szabó]
|
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3906
|
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
[Scruton]
|
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4029
|
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all
[Mellor/Oliver]
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16263
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Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties
[Maudlin]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
[Macdonald,C]
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19121
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We can reduce properties to true formulas
[Halbach/Leigh]
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