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Single Idea 3934

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique ]

Full Idea

A mite must be supposed to see his own foot as a body of some considerable dimension, though they appear to you scarcely discernible.

Clarification

A mite is a small insect

Gist of Idea

A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny

Source

George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.170)

Book Ref

Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.170


A Reaction

Berkeley is confused. Hot is secondary, but temperature is primary. Bigness is secondary, size primay. Midgets and tall people don't disagree over the size of a table.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [criticism of the primary/secondary distinction]:

Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]