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Single Idea 3976
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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Full Idea
If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions.
Clarification
'Intentional science' is explanation of behaviour using what the agent is thinking
Gist of Idea
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.293
A Reaction
The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist).
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[how can intentional states be explained?]:
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6491
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Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
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18088
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Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental
[Place]
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2554
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Is intentionality a special sort of function?
[Rorty]
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
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3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
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2325
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It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
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3365
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Intentionality involves both reference and content
[Kim]
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2527
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Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind
[Dennett]
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3158
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Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it
[Dennett]
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3976
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Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
[Fodor]
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3980
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Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols
[Fodor]
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7326
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Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
[Fodor]
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15494
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We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
[Fodor]
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2981
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Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese?
[Lyons on Fodor]
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
[Kirk,R]
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3164
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Intentional explanations are always circular
[Rey]
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6537
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Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
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2978
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Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality
[Lyons]
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2400
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Is intentionality just causal connections?
[Chalmers]
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7010
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Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
[Heil]
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7054
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Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
[Heil]
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4626
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The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
[Heil]
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4940
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Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals
[Edelman/Tononi]
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