more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions.
Clarification
'Intentional science' is explanation of behaviour using what the agent is thinking
Gist of Idea
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.293
A Reaction
The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist).
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |