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Full Idea
Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances.
Clarification
'Counterfactuals' make statements about what might happen, usually beginning with "If…"
Gist of Idea
Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.293
A Reaction
This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |