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Single Idea 3981
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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Full Idea
These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable.
Clarification
A thing is 'multiply realisable' if it can be implemented in more than one physical way (e.g. a switch)
Gist of Idea
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.298
A Reaction
This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals).
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[lots of way to implement a thought]:
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6376
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Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity
[Polger on Putnam]
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2330
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If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state
[Putnam, by Kim]
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7432
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One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
[Armstrong]
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3429
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Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
[Davidson, by Kim]
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3497
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If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
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6992
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If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
[Jackson]
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
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4892
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If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
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7443
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A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia
[Lewis, by PG]
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4878
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The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors
[Dennett]
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2579
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Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds
[Block]
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2598
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Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
[Fodor]
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3981
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Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
[Fodor]
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3512
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If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
[Papineau]
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4985
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If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
[Kirk,R]
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3185
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Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts
[McGinn]
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6542
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A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
[Chalmers]
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
[Heil]
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4619
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'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
[Heil]
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4620
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Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
[Heil]
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4933
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Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes
[Edelman/Tononi]
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7734
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Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's
[PG]
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7735
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Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally
[PG]
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