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Full Idea
These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable.
Clarification
A thing is 'multiply realisable' if it can be implemented in more than one physical way (e.g. a switch)
Gist of Idea
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.298
A Reaction
This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals).
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |