more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 3986

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance ]

Full Idea

The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent.

Gist of Idea

The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)

Book Ref

'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.239


A Reaction

This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers


The 4 ideas with the same theme [mind as a fiction created to deal with behaviour]:

Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]