more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3994
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
]
Full Idea
Human pain might be one thing. Martian pain might be something else.
Clarification
'Martian pain' would be a quite different feeling, playing the same functional role as our 'pain'
Gist of Idea
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
Source
David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.420)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.420
A Reaction
A key suggestion in support of type-type physicalism, and against the multiple realisability objection to the identity theory
The
39 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is entirely physical in composition]:
24042
|
The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles
[Diogenes of Apollonia]
|
23217
|
All of our happiness and misery arises entirely from the brain
[Hippocrates]
|
20913
|
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body
[Democritus, by Theophrastus]
|
24041
|
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche]
[Democritus, by Aristotle]
|
13275
|
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax
[Aristotle]
|
20831
|
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear
[Cleanthes]
|
5719
|
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch
[Lucretius]
|
5724
|
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies
[Lucretius]
|
23220
|
The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision
[Galen]
|
16618
|
Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence
[Blasius, by Pasnau]
|
2948
|
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being
[Hobbes]
|
6208
|
Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head
[Hobbes]
|
23221
|
The brain, and all the mental events within it, consists entirely of sensitive and rational matter
[Cavendish]
|
4834
|
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension
[Spinoza]
|
7652
|
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified
[La Mettrie]
|
19573
|
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate
[Novalis]
|
5329
|
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation!
[Ayer]
|
7431
|
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
[Armstrong]
|
5797
|
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons
[Searle]
|
7430
|
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't
[Armstrong on Kripke]
|
6976
|
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
[Jackson]
|
3374
|
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
[Kim]
|
7445
|
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent
[Lewis]
|
3994
|
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
[Lewis]
|
8579
|
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
[Lewis]
|
4879
|
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey
[Dennett]
|
2468
|
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
|
2464
|
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
[Fodor]
|
3515
|
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing
[Papineau]
|
7892
|
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
[Papineau]
|
6544
|
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
[Lycan]
|
6503
|
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
[Robinson,H]
|
4075
|
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
[Crane]
|
4085
|
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
[Crane]
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
|
6380
|
Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property
[Polger]
|
20656
|
Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs
[Watson]
|
11142
|
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme
[Margolis/Laurence]
|
17766
|
Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous
[Bayne]
|