more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property.
Clarification
'Coextensive' properties apply to the same objects; predicates are linguistic expressions of properties
Gist of Idea
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates)
Source
comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.4
A Reaction
Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects.
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |