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Single Idea 4031

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism ]

Full Idea

I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness.

Clarification

Predicates are part of language, properties part of reality

Gist of Idea

It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property

Source

David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.13


A Reaction

At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language


The 13 ideas with the same theme [unversals are really just linguistic predicates]:

Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]