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Single Idea 4035

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates ]

Full Idea

When we have said that predicates apply to objects, we have surely not said enough. The situation cries out for an explanation. Must there not be something specific about the things which allows, indeed ensures, that these predicates apply?

Clarification

'Predicates' are part of language

Gist of Idea

There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.164

A Reaction

A nice challenge to any philosopher who places too much emphasis on language. A random and arbitrary (nominalist?) language simply wouldn't work. Nature has joints.

The 17 ideas from 'Properties'

4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]