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Single Idea 4036

[filed under theme 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor ]

Full Idea

Armstrong argues that what matters is not how few entities we postulate (quantitative economy), but how few kinds of entities (qualitative economy).

Gist of Idea

What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities

Source

report of David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §9

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.22

A Reaction

Is this what Ockham meant? Armstrong is claiming that the notion of a 'property' is needed to identify kinds. See also Idea 7038.

Related Idea

Idea 7038 A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]

The 17 ideas from 'Properties'

4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]