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Single Idea 4069

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism ]

Full Idea

It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible.

Gist of Idea

Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.38


A Reaction

I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms.

Related Idea

Idea 5011 There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind and matter are two quite different substances]:

Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin]
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus]
The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus]
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes]
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant]
Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]