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Single Idea 4069
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
]
Full Idea
It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible.
Gist of Idea
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.38
A Reaction
I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms.
Related Idea
Idea 5011
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
The
42 ideas
from 'Elements of Mind'
4063
|
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
[Crane]
|
4065
|
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
|
4067
|
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
[Crane]
|
4066
|
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate
[Crane]
|
4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
|
4069
|
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
[Crane]
|
4071
|
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
[Crane]
|
4072
|
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
[Crane]
|
4073
|
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
[Crane]
|
4076
|
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
[Crane]
|
4074
|
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
[Crane]
|
4075
|
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
[Crane]
|
4077
|
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
[Crane]
|
4078
|
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
[Crane]
|
4080
|
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
[Crane]
|
4079
|
Properties are causes
[Crane]
|
4083
|
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
[Crane]
|
4084
|
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
[Crane]
|
4082
|
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
[Crane]
|
4085
|
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
[Crane]
|
4068
|
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
[Crane]
|
4087
|
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4089
|
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
[Crane]
|
4090
|
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
[Crane]
|
4092
|
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
[Crane]
|
4091
|
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
[Crane]
|
4093
|
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
[Crane]
|
4094
|
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
[Crane]
|
4096
|
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
[Crane]
|
4095
|
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4097
|
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
[Crane]
|
4098
|
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
[Crane]
|
4100
|
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
[Crane]
|
4101
|
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
[Crane]
|
4103
|
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
[Crane]
|
4104
|
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
[Crane]
|
4102
|
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
[Crane]
|
4105
|
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
[Crane]
|
4106
|
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
[Crane]
|
4108
|
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
[Crane]
|
4107
|
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
[Crane]
|
4109
|
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual
[Crane]
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