more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 4070

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism ]

Full Idea

According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance.

Gist of Idea

Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.38

A Reaction

Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [mind is a non-reducible physical property]:

5779 There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
3453 Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
3455 Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
3456 Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
3475 Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
2489 Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
4070 Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
2406 H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
6622 Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
3520 Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]