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Full Idea
Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena.
Clarification
Epiphenomena are side effects which play no causal role in events
Gist of Idea
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.51
A Reaction
I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components.
3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |