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Single Idea 4074
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
]
Full Idea
Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena.
Clarification
Epiphenomena are side effects which play no causal role in events
Gist of Idea
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.51
A Reaction
I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components.
The
45 ideas
from Tim Crane
8384
|
The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved
[Crane]
|
8387
|
A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties
[Crane]
|
8386
|
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences
[Crane]
|
4063
|
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
[Crane]
|
4065
|
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
|
4066
|
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate
[Crane]
|
4067
|
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
[Crane]
|
4069
|
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
[Crane]
|
4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
|
4071
|
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
[Crane]
|
4072
|
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
[Crane]
|
4073
|
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
[Crane]
|
4074
|
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
[Crane]
|
4075
|
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
[Crane]
|
4076
|
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
[Crane]
|
4077
|
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
[Crane]
|
4078
|
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
[Crane]
|
4079
|
Properties are causes
[Crane]
|
4080
|
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
[Crane]
|
4084
|
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
[Crane]
|
4082
|
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
[Crane]
|
4083
|
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
[Crane]
|
4085
|
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
[Crane]
|
4068
|
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
[Crane]
|
4087
|
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4089
|
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
[Crane]
|
4090
|
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
[Crane]
|
4092
|
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
[Crane]
|
4091
|
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
[Crane]
|
4093
|
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
[Crane]
|
4094
|
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
[Crane]
|
4096
|
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
[Crane]
|
4095
|
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
[Crane]
|
4097
|
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
[Crane]
|
4098
|
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
[Crane]
|
4100
|
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
[Crane]
|
4101
|
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
[Crane]
|
4102
|
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
[Crane]
|
4103
|
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
[Crane]
|
4104
|
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
[Crane]
|
4105
|
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
[Crane]
|
4106
|
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
[Crane]
|
4108
|
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
[Crane]
|
4107
|
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
[Crane]
|
4109
|
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual
[Crane]
|