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Single Idea 4084

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism ]

Full Idea

While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature.

Clarification

'Supervenience' is a relationship of an inextricable link

Gist of Idea

Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.66


A Reaction

A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [mind as a product of complex matter]:

The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus]
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum]